How Will the Attacks on Chinese Enterprises in Tajikistan Shape Beijing’s Behavior in the Region and Beyond?

The terrorist attacks on Chinese enterprises in Tajikistan, carried out from Afghan territory, are likely to have a significant effect on the mindset of China’s political elite and their perception of Beijing’s role in both the regional and global arenas—especially in the context of military-strategic and military-political planning at the regional and global levels. Below, we examine this question and identify the main factors that may shape China’s behavior in light of these incidents, particularly the attacks on Chinese enterprises in Tajikistan’s southern provinces.

The Gift-Bearing Dragon: China as a Global Economic Power

Over a historically brief period, China has transformed from an underdeveloped agrarian state into a global economic powerhouse with interests reaching virtually all corners of the world. China’s GDP rose from 150 billion USD in 1978 to 17 trillion USD in 2023. Average annual GDP growth during this period reached 9.4%; the size of the economy expanded 37-fold and accounted for nearly 25% of total global economic growth. GDP per capita increased from 385 yuan in 1978 to 64,644 yuan in 2018. Whereas China represented 1.7% of global GDP in 1978, by 2023 its share had grown to 17%.

China is now the principal trading partner for more than 120 countries. Its share of global trade rose from 1% in 1978 to 12.4% in 2023. Outbound Chinese investment increased 61-fold between 2003 and 2023. China’s global investment footprint continues to expand rapidly: in 2023 alone, its outward FDI totaled 177.3 billion USD, placing it third globally after the United States and Japan. China is especially active in developing economies along the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In 2023, Chinese FDI in BRI countries grew by 31.5%, reaching 40.7 billion USD. As of 2023, roughly 48,000 Chinese enterprises operated abroad, employing about 430,000 people—40% of whom were Chinese nationals. These overseas investments underpin China’s economic growth, which the Chinese elite regard as the cornerstone of national survival. Yet China’s expanding global presence exposes it to growing threats and requires the continuous protection of its worldwide interests, a concern that strongly shapes elite perceptions.

“Warning Signals”

China’s interests abroad have suffered repeated setbacks over recent decades, revealing gaps in Beijing’s ability to safeguard them. One defining incident—still deeply etched into the consciousness of the Chinese elite—was NATO’s 1999 bombing of the PRC Embassy during the Yugoslav conflict. The attack killed three Chinese citizens and injured twenty more. Beijing denounced the strike as a “deliberate violation” of China’s sovereignty. China’s elite viewed this precedent as the first major challenge to the Middle Kingdom’s global interests, as evidence of an inability to secure them, and as an indication of a hostile international environment. It also served as a catalyst for strengthening China’s military-political power.

At the turn of the century, China embarked on rapid military modernization, allocating substantial resources year after year. While the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) faced budget cuts throughout the 1980s and 1990s—reaching a historical low of 1.03% of GDP in 1997—China’s defense budget grew by an average of 16.2% annually between 1999 and 2008. During the 2000s, the Chinese defense industry made generational leaps, transitioning, for example, from producing second-generation fighter aircraft directly to fourth-generation models. By the end of the decade, the PRC had emerged as a major military power.

In September of this year, China held the largest military parade in its history, showcasing its military strength and its newest technological advances. Many experts noted the scale of China’s progress. China’s 2024 defense budget exceeded 231 billion USD — second only to that of the United States—representing a 7.2% increase over 2023. Beijing has simultaneously expanded its military-strategic aims, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region (APR), which the Chinese elite view as the primary source of security threats. The U.S. “pivot to Asia” in the 2010s and concerns among China’s neighbors over Beijing’s rising power have intensified regional tensions, inevitably shaping China’s military planning.

Beijing’s objective is to achieve military dominance in the APR, enabling China to safeguard national security and protect vital interests, including reunification with Taiwan and strengthening sovereignty over disputed territories in the South China Sea.

However, China’s security concerns extend far beyond the APR or its immediate neighborhood—an insight underscored by the NATO bombing of the PRC Embassy. Another telling example lies in the Middle East and Africa. Since the early 2000s, Beijing’s presence in these regions has expanded significantly, turning them into critical arenas for China’s development and security. Yet China’s interests there have repeatedly come under threat, and in several cases China struggled to defend them decisively.

Prior to the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya and the fall of the Gaddafi regime, the PRC enjoyed a strong foothold in the country. Chinese investments totaled 18.8 billion USD; 75 Chinese companies operated in Libya, employing 36,000 Chinese citizens. Libya supplied 3% of China’s crude oil imports. However, China was unable to prevent the intervention or preserve a friendly regime in this resource-rich state. It also faced significant operational challenges. Beijing struggled, for example, to evacuate its citizens once destabilization began, largely because it lacked a military foothold in the region to support such operations. The Libyan crisis—and the broader “Arab Spring”—reinforced among China’s elite the sense of fragility surrounding the PRC’s interests in the Middle East and Africa. As a response, China established its first—and so far only—overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017 to safeguard its strategic presence.

Consequences of the Attacks on Chinese Enterprises in Tajikistan: Regional and Global Dimensions

The attacks on Chinese enterprises in Tajikistan are likely to produce several significant consequences for China’s behavior both in Central Asia and globally.

First, Beijing may deepen its security engagement in Central Asia. China already cooperates with regional states in both multilateral (primarily through the SCO) and bilateral formats. Key areas include counterterrorism, combating extremism, drug trafficking, and the illicit arms trade. Beijing conducts joint exercises with Central Asian states, supplies military equipment, and provides security assistance. The incident along the Tajik-Afghan border may push China to further expand its security presence in Central Asia—particularly in addressing cross-border criminal threats.

Second, implications for China–Russia relations. Although China is an active security actor in Central Asia, Russia traditionally retains primacy in this domain and is viewed as the main security guarantor for regional states. This arrangement has long persisted partly because major neighboring powers—including China—did not seek to dominate the region’s security space and were content with Russia’s leading role. However, the attacks on Chinese enterprises may encourage Beijing to expand its security footprint, creating competition with Moscow and offering Central Asian states opportunities to diversify their external partnerships. This dynamic could generate friction between Russia and China.

Third, a broader reassessment of China’s global security posture. The incident at the Tajikistan–Afghanistan border may reinforce within the Chinese elite a heightened sense of global vulnerability. This could further accelerate China’s military modernization, drive Beijing to expand its presence within global security architecture, and contribute to an intensifying arms race.